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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACK CHRISTIANSON and
MURL CHRISTIANSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
11685

JOANNE DRBRY,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Jack Christianson, brought this
action for property damage, and the plaintiff, Murl
Christianson, brought the action for personal injuries
alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
defendant.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court, upon motion of the plaintiffs,
entered judgment in favor of Jack Christianson for
property damage in the amount of $77.62 plus his
costs, and in favor of the plaintiff, lVIurl Christianson,
on the issue of liability, reserving for trial only the
issue of damages to the plaintiff, Murl Christianson
(R-27). The issue of damages with reference to the
plaintiff, Murl Christianson, was tried to a jury. Contrary to the statement in Appellant's brief, the District
Court entered judgment on the jury verdict which
awarded plaintiff, Murl Christianson, $1,500 for general damages and $1,054.59 special damages (R-71).
Thereafter the plaintiff, Murl Christianson, moved
the trial court for a new trial upon the same grounds
and for the same reasons as submitted to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in the brief of Appellant
(R-75). Memorandums were submitted to the court
by both the Appellant and the Respondent and the
District Court entered its order denying the plaintiff's
motion for a new trial (R-80 through R-87 inclusive).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff, Murl Christianson, has taken this
appeal and has requested the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah to grant a new trial on the issue of
damages. The Respondent opposes thf relief sought
by the Appellant.
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STATElVlENT OF FACTS
The Respondent admits the facts stated by the
Appellant but believes the facts are insufficient to
provide this Honorable Court with a proper perspective. The Respondent recites other additional facts
which Respondent believes to be pertinent:
Appellant was a passenger in an automobile which
was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by
the Ilespondent on the 23rd day of September, 1965
(R-103, 104, 105). Immediatley following the accident
the Appellant continued with her planned evening's
activities by going to the show at the Valley :Music Hall
(R-123). The damage to the vehicle was modest; the
repairs having cost $77.62 (R-2, R-22).
Within a few days after the accident the Appellant
saw Dr. Groneman on one professional visit for which
she was charged $5.00 (R-21). Except for his initial
examination and his prescription for therapy she was
not treated further by Dr. Groneman (R-125). Dr.
Groneman was not called as a witness.
The Appellant was first seen by Dr. Chapman
on April 19, 1967, some eighteen months after she had
seen Dr. Groneman (R-136}.
"Thile she was being seen and treated by Dr. Chapman she continued to drive from her home in Utah
County to Price, Utah, to assist her ill mother and
father in the operation of a motel (R-125, 126).
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The Appellant was seen and examined bv Dr. S.
"\Villiam Allred on October 22, 1968 (R-188°).
Dr. Chapman hospitalized )!rs. Christianson and
performed a myelogram on January 2, 1969 (R-148).
X-rays were taken by Dr. Groneman in September
of 1965 (R-160, 162, Ex. D-7, D-12). X-ravs were
taken by Dr. Chapman in April of 1967 (R-136, 150,
151, 152, Ex. P--1, P-5, P-6). X-ravs
. were taken bv.
Dr. Allred in October of 1968 (R-188, 191, Ex. D-14,
D-15, D-16, D-17). X-rays were taken and a myelogram performed by Dr. Chapman in January of 1969
(R-148).
Dr. Chapman was called as a plaintiff's witness
(R-133). Dr. Chapman had not examined the 196j
X-ray taken by Dr. Groneman until the time of trial
R-160). During the trial Dr. Chapman examined the
Groneman X-ray tR-162, Ex. D-12) that was taken
wit run a few days after the accident and acknowledged
that this X-ray showed a narrowing disk space that
predated the accident l R-163). Dr. Chapman further
acknowledged that ··it is possible for a disk to degenerate and cause the type of symptoms suffered by )!rs.
Christianson without a traumatic injury .. \ R-160, 1611.
Dr. Ch:1pman categorically stated that the disk narrowiuO' demonstrable on the Gnineman X-ray
. was not
caused by the :1ccident and was nC1t related to the
nutonwbile accident 1R-llH. hi:?. 103 ·. Dr. Chapman
further testitied that there was not any appreciable
differences in the X-r:1ys taken bY Dr. Grlinernan in

September of 1965, and the X-rays taken by him in
April of 1967 (R-165). Dr. Chapman testified that the
myelogram taken in January of 1969 disclosed a disk
protrusion (R-149).
Dr. Allred was called as a witness for the defendant concerning his examination of the Appellant of
October 22, 1968 (R-187). He testified that his examination did not reveal any numbness; did not reveal
any difficulty with her eyes; and that it did reveal au
actual range of the neck with no associated muscle
spasm. He could find no specific areas of trigger point
pain. She had a full range of motion of her upper
extremities. There was no evidence of atrophy about
the upper extremities. The reflexes and sensation of
the upper extremities were normal and the grip of
her hands was good bilaterally (R-189, 190). He
further expressed the opinion that there was no specific
nerve root irritation (R-190). Dr. Allred took X-rays
which demonstrated the same degenerative disk disease
that was shown on the Groneman X-ray in 1965. He
testified that "the lipping of the cervical spine would
have taken more than four or five years to develop"
(R-191, 192, Ex. D-14, D-15, D-16, D-17). Dr. Allred testified that in his opinion the condition of the
cervical spine was present prior to the accident which
occurred in September of 1965 (R-194). Dr. Allred
testified that the myelogram did not show a disk protrusion but that it showed "the lipping" of the cervical
spine that occurred gradually over a period of time
(R-195). He further testified that a myelogram taken
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prior to the accident would have shown the same condition (R-195).
On cross-examination of Dr. Allred it was his testimony that in his examination of October 22, 1968, he
could not find any objective cause for the symptoms
complained of by the Appellant (R. 219).
The medical testimony in this case is lengthy. The
direct examination of Dr. Chapman takes 27 pages
of the record and his cross-examination takes 19 pages
of the record. The redirect examination of Dr. Chapman takes 7 pages of the record. The direct examination
of Dr. Allred takes 9 pages of the record. His crossexamination takes 24 pages of the record; his redirect
examination and recross-examination takes 3 pages
of the record (R. 133-through R-222 inclusive).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS OF DR.
ALLRED OBJECTED TO BY THE APPELLANT.
In redirect examination of Dr. Allred counsel for
the defendant asked a series of questions. The same
was objected to by plaintiff's counsel because the questions were based upon the word "could." It is submitted that under the circumstances the word "could"
was perfectly proper. Plaintiff's counsel had every
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opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Allred and following
the redirect by the defense, plaintiff again had the opportunity to further examine Dr. Allred.
The material found in 31 Am. J ur. 2d under Expert
and Opinion Evidence states the rule. Section 44 on
page 548 states:
"Expert opinion testimony may be given in
terms of an opinion that something might, could,
or would produce a certain result. Opinion testimony of this nature is said to be admitted into
evidence on the theory that an expert witness'
view as to probabilities is often helpful in the
determination .of questions involving matters
of science or technical or skilled knowledge."
See Section 103:
" . . . A very liberal practice of permitting
opinion teistimony of experts in the field of
medical practice is indulged. A duly qualified
physician may . . . state his opinion as to the
nature of the disease, injury, or disability, from
which a person is or was suffering, and as to the
facts or causes which probably, or might have,
produced such condition .
"
See Section 113:
"As a general rule, expert medical op1mon
evidence has been admitted where the witness
expressed it in language which sufficiently described the opinion as representing his own best
judgment regarding particular facts or hypotheses supported by the evidence, and indicated
with reasonable certainty that causation existed
or could be found, the testimony not constituting
a pure, unsupported conclusion; and, as satisfy-
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ing this requirement, courts have approved substantiated statements of probability, possibility,
and likelihood, and statements to the effect that
a cause might lead or could have lead to a result
proved. Such witnesses have been permitted to
state what in their opinion was the "possible,"
"probable," or "likely," etc., cause of, or what
"might" or "could" have caused, death or a particula,r physical condition."
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Moore
v. D. & R.G., cited in 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P 2d 849
( 1956) reversed the trial court because in the view of
the Supreme Court there was insufficient evidence to
create a jury issue because the only medical testimony
related to a "possibility." The Supreme Court found
that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden with such a
limited amount of evidence. However, the Court in that
case used the following language:
"This court has ]ong recognized that the mere
use of words such as "belief," "impression,"
"probability," or "possibility" will not exclude a
witness' testimony where his expression does not
indicate a lack of personal observation, but mere1y
the degree of positiveness of his original observation of the facts or the degree of positiveness
of his recollection."
In a subsequent case In Re Richard's Estate cited
in 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P 2d 542 (1956) the Supreme
Court of Utah referred to the Moore v. D. & R. G.
case on page 547 as follows:
"Counsel further suggests that the answers
of this expert were so uncertain and vague that
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they sh?uld not have been submitted to the jury
... This was an erroneous interpretation of that
holding. That case recognized that the mere use
of such words as "belief," "impression," "probability," or "possibility" did not render testimony
inadmissible, but held that in the particular context the qualifying phrases rendered the testimony too insubstantial when standing alone to
support the verdict."
It is submitted that there was no impropriety in
permitting Dr. Allred to answer the questions containing the word "could."

POINT II
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED IN ANY WAY BY THE QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS OF DR. ALLRED TO
WHICH THE APPELLANT HAS OBJECTED.
Considering the lengthy medical testimony by the
two physicians who were called as witnesses and considering their agreement in some regards and their
disagreement in others, it cannot be said that the jury
was not fully and completely apprised of the contentions
of the parties. The jury had a full and fair opportunity
to hear, see and understand the testimony of both physicians and to hear them express those certain opinions
wherein they agreed and those certain opinions wherein
they disagreed.
By reviewing a few of the pertinent and essential
facts the verdict of the jury is understandable; is com-
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pletely supported by such facts and cannot be said to
be the result of any passion or prejudice. For the purpose of justifying the jury's verdict, I call to the attention of the court some of the specific facts over which
there was no controversy and which stand in the record
uncontroverted:
1. Following the accident the plaintiff saw her

family physician on one professional visit and was not
thereafter seen or treated by him on a professional basis.

2. Some eighteen ( 18) months after the accident

the Appellant went to see Dr. Chapman for the first
time.

3. Dr. Chapman admitted that she had a pre-

existing cervical condition and his testimony was to the
effect that it had been in the making for at least ten
years prior to the date of the accident. His opinion
was corroborated by the opinion of Dr. Allred.
4. The nature of the impact between the cars was

modest as was evidenced by the photograph introduced
into evidence showing the condition of plaintiff's car
following the accident, and further substantiated by
the fact that the repair bill was less than $80.
5. The modest nature of the impact was further

demonstrated by the fact that the Appellant and other
parties in the vehicle went on to Valley Music Hall,
stayed and watched the show and then drove back home
that evening.
'Vhile Dr. Allred's testimony was in conflict with
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that of Dr. Chapman, it should be noted that it was the
opinion of Dr. Allred that had a myeloma been taken
befort. the accident that it would have shown the same
results as the myelogram taken some two months before
the trial, and he explained this by indicating on the
X-ray taken the day after the accident the spurring on
the bony structure that caused the displacement in the
spinal column of the radioactive material used in the
myelogram.
The jury awarded to the Appellant all of the
medicals and specials claimed by Appellant and in
addition thereto awarded to her $1,500 general damages. It is obvious that the jury believed, and such
belief is substantiated by the evidence, that Appellant
had a preexisting condition and that the Respondent
was in no way responsible for all of the physical diff iculties and problems of the Appellant.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court and the jury should
be affirmed and the appeal of the Appellant demanding
a new trial on the issue of damages should be denied
and dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES P. COWLEY
400 El Paso Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
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